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 Personality Measurement and Assessment: An Overview 
Gregory J. Boyle, Gerald Matthews, & Donald H. Saklofske 
A colleague recently remarked: “Psychologists who specialize in the study of personality 
and individual differences spend a lot of time coming up with various descriptions of 
people, like Machiavellianism, external locus of control, openness to experience, and 
Neuroticism.  Even more effort is spent trying to measure these ideas with tests like the 
MMPI-2, brief anxiety scales, and Rorschach Inkblots.  But do they really tell us 
anything about human behaviour in general or about the individual?  Does it make a 
difference in how we view people, select them for jobs, or guide therapy choices and 
assist in evaluating outcomes”? 
 
This is a very loaded question and one that appears to challenge both the technical 
adequacy of our personality measures, but especially the construct and criterion validity 
or effectiveness of personality instruments in describing individual differences, clinical 
diagnosis and guiding and evaluating interventions. Technically; there are very few actual 
“tests” of personality—the Objective-Analytic Battery being an exception.  Most so-
called “tests” of personality are in fact self-report scales or reports of others’ rating scales.  
Such scales quantify subjective introspections, or subjective impressions of others’ 
personality make-up.  At the same time, it is a relevant question and one that we will 
continue to face in the study of personality and the application of the findings, including 
assessment of personality, within psychological practice areas such as clinical, and school 
psychology, and within settings such as the military, business and sporting fields, among 
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others.  Vol. 1 in this two volume series is devoted to a critical analysis of the theories, 
models and resulting research that drive the personality descriptions and assessment 
discussed in Volume 2.  Demonstrating both the construct and practical validity of 
personality descriptions is essential to psychology as a scientific discipline and 
empirically grounded practice/profession. 
 
The Status of Psychological Assessment 
In a recently published paper focusing on psychological assessment, the following claim 
was made:  
Data from more than 125 meta-analyses on test validity and 800 samples 
examining multimethod assessment suggest four general conclusions: (a) 
Psychological test validity is strong and compelling, (b) psychological test 
validity is comparable to medical test validity, (c) distinct assessment 
methods provide unique sources of information, and (d) clinicians who 
rely exclusively on interviews are prone to incomplete understandings 
(Meyer et al., 2001, p. 128). 
 
The authors also stated that multiple methods of assessment in the hands of “skilled 
clinicians” further enhanced the validity of the assessments so that the focus should now 
move on to how we use these scales in clinical practice to inform diagnosis and 
prescription. 
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This is a remarkable accomplishment, if accurate, and even a bold claim that has not gone 
unchallenged.  Claims (a) and (b) have been attacked on various grounds (e.g., see 
critiques by Fernandez-Ballesteros, 2002; Garb et al., 2002; Hunsley, 2002; Smith, 2002).  
Furthermore the debate about the clinical or treatment validity of psychological 
assessment and the added or incremental value of multimethod assessment is argued by 
some to not rest on solid empirical ground (e.g., Hunsley, 2003), in spite of such carefully 
argued presentations on the utility of integrative assessment of personality with both 
adults (e.g., Beutler & Groth-Marnat, 2003) and children (e.g., Riccio & Rodriguez, 
2007; Flanagan, 2007).  In fact this is very much the argument put forward by supporters 
of RTI (respnse to intervention) in challenge to the view that diagnostic assessment, using 
multiple assessment methods, should point the way to both diagnosis and intervention 
planning (see special issue of Psychology in the Schools, 43,7, 2006). 
 
While the Meyer et al. review focused on all areas of psychological assessment, it does 
suggest that the theories and models, as well as research findings describing various 
latent traits underlying individual differences have produced sufficient information to 
allow for reliable and valid measurement and in turn, application of these assessment 
findings to understanding, predicting and even changing human behaviour associated 
with intelligence, personality and conation (see Boyle & Saklofske, 2004).  While there 
has been considerable progress, but certainly not a consensus in the models and measures 
used to describe intelligence and cognitive abilities, the other main individual 
differences’ areas of personality and conation have traveled a somewhat different path to 
their current position in psychological assessment. 
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Calling this a remarkable accomplishment also has to be put in the context of time.  
Psychological science is only slightly more than 125 years old.  As a profession that 
applies the research findings from both experimental and correlational studies in 
diagnosis, intervention and prevention in health care settings, schools, business, etc., 
psychology is even younger.  Specializations that are heavily grounded in psychological 
assessment such as clinical, school, counseling, and industrial-organizational psychology 
only began to appear more or less in their present form in the mid-20th century.  While it 
can be debated, the success of the Binet intelligence scales in both Europe and North 
America in the early 1900s, followed by the widespread use of ability and personality 
instruments for military selection during WW1 in the USA, and the growing interest in 
psychoanalysis complimented by development and use of projective measures to tap 
“hidden” personality structures, provided the strong foundation for the contemporary 
measurement and assessment of personality. 
 
A Brief Historical Note on Psychological Assessment 
However, history shows that the description and assessment of individual differences is 
not new to psychology.  Sattler (2001) and Aiken (2000) have provided brief outlines of 
key events in cognitive and educational assessment during the several hundred years prior 
to the founding of psychology and one can clearly sense that the “tasks” of psychological 
measurement were being determined during this time.  Prior to the creative scientific 
studies by Galton in the 19th century, the first psychological laboratory established in 
1879 by Wundt, and psychology’s earliest efforts at measuring the “faculties of the mind” 
 5 
during the Brass Instruments era (e.g., James McK Cattell), there is a long history 
documenting efforts to describe the basis for human behaviour and what makes us alike 
all others and yet unique in other ways.  As early as 4000 years ago in China, there is 
evidence of very basic testing programs for determining the “fit” for various civil 
servants followed by the use of written exams some 2000 years ago that continued in 
various forms through to the start of the 20th century.  Efforts to understand and assess 
human personality also have a long history that predates the study of psychology.  
Centuries before the psychoanalytic descriptions of Freud, who argued for the importance 
of the unconscious and suggested that the putative tripartite personality structure of the id, 
ego, and superego were shaped by a developmental process reflected in psychosexual 
stages, the Roman physician Galen contended that human personality was a function of 
the body secretions (humors).  Galen subsequently outlined the first personality typology 
characterized by the choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic types. 
 
Interest in such processes as memory and reaction time, and efforts to assess and 
distinguish between mental retardation and mental illness were already underway before 
the establishment of Galton’s psychometric laboratory in London and Wundt’s and 
Cattell’s psychophysical laboratories in Germany and the USA respectively. While much 
of this work was focused on the study of intelligence and cognitive abilities, it laid the the 
foundation for psychological testing and assessment that has shaped the face of 
psychology today.  Probably the greatest impetus for test development came as a result of 
the success of the Binet intelligence tests, first in France and then in the USA.  The use of 
tests to classify school children according to ability was followed by the development and 
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use of the Army Alpha and Beta tests to aid in the selection of recruits (in terms of their 
cognitive abilities) for military service in the US Army.  However at that same time, it 
was also recognised that there was a need to identify military recruits who might be prone 
to, or manifest the symptoms of psychological disorders.  Woodsworth (1919) created the 
Personal Data Sheet that presented examinees with a questionnaire not unlike those 
found on scales tapping psychiatric disorders to which a “yes-no” response could be 
made.  While there was not a control or check for “faking good-faking bad” protocols, 
the measure was deemed to be a success.  Thus, well before the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI), constructed by Hathaway and McKinley (1940) and its 
revised version (MMPI-2), as well as the California Psychological Inventory (CPI), and 
other more recent personality measures, Woodworth’s (1919) Personal Data Sheet, was 
followed shortly after by other personality scales such as the Thurstone Personality 
Schedule (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1930) and the Bernreuter Personality Inventory 
(Bernreuter, 1931), which may be considered the earliest personality measures, at least 
employing a contemporary questionnaire format.  Of interest is that other measures being 
constructed around the same time highlighted the divergent views on personality 
assessment methods at the time including the Rorschach Inkblot test (Rorschach, 1921) 
and the Human Figure Drawings (Goodenough, 1926) and the Sentence Completion 
Tests (Payne, 1928). 
 
Psychological Science vs. Pseudoscience 
The basis by which current psychological assessment methods and practices can be 
separated from other attempts to describe the latent traits and processes underlying 
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differences in human behaviour is the very fact that they are grounded in scientific 
research, as outlined in the editors’ introduction to Vol. 1.  It is science that forces a 
method of study including, objectivity, experimentation and empirical support of 
hypotheses, and requires the creation and testing of theories.  Psychology requires the 
operationalizing of variables and factors to be used in a description of human behaviour.  
In contrast to pseudosciences that operate outside of this framework and rest their case in 
beliefs, personal viewpoints, and idiosyncratic opinions, psychology also demands 
replication and, where possible, quantification of measures. 
 
Measurement is the cornerstone of psychology and has spawned a number of methods for 
gathering the very data that may demonstrate the usefulness or lack of usefulness of a 
theory or provide the information needed to describe a particular human personality 
characteristic or even diagnose a personality disorder or clinical condition.  
Pseudosciences such as astrology, palmistry and phrenology, that compete with 
psychological views of personality, do not require such objective evidence to support 
their claims; rather vague “theories” are treated as fact and so-called evidence is often 
tautological.  Thus a strength of psychology is that it has as its basis, measurement that 
includes varying methods of gathering data to test theoretical ideas and hypotheses, as 
well as strict adherence to psychometric measurement principles such as reliability, 
validity and standardization (cf. Boyle, 1985). 
 
Foundations of Personality Measurement and Assessment 
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As mentioned above, it was concurrent with the advent of WW1 that a major effort to 
assess personality characteristics was first witnessed.  Prior to that time, the closest 
measure of personality would likely be considered the word association techniques used 
by Jung.  Today almost everyone is familiar with personality measures, self report 
questionnaires and rating scales that most often appear in the form of a statement or 
question (e.g., “ I am a very nervous person”; “I enjoy activities where there are a lot of 
people and excitement”) that the client answers with a “yes-no,” “true-false” or an 
extended scale such as a 5 or 7 point or greater Likert-type scale with anchors such as 
“always true of me- never true of me” or “definitely like me- not at all like me.”  These 
highly structured measures contrast with the more ambiguous, subjective, and open ended 
techniques most often found in projective tests such as the Rorschach Inkblot or Thematic 
Apperception Tests. 
 
Indeed, there is a longstanding tension between objective and subjective strategies for 
personality assessment (see Cattell & Johnson, 1986).  Use of questionnaires based on 
subjective insights and self-reports has dominated the field, but one may wonder how 
much this dominance reflects the convenience and low cost of questionnaire assessment.  
Advocates of objective testing may legitimately question the validity of subjective 
experience and the apparent ease with which desirable responses may be faked.  Table 1 
sets out the key issues dividing the two camps; both have strengths and weaknesses.  We 
do not take a position on which approach is ultimately to be preferred; the chapters in this 
volume illustrate the vitality of both subjective and objective measurement approaches.  
Ideally, multimethod measurement models in which subjective and objective indices 
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converged on common latent traits are to be desired, but current measurement technology 
remains some way from achieving this goal. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Given the more common use of standardized personality measures such as, for example, 
the MMPI-2, CPI, 16-PF, EPQ-R, and NEO-PI-R, a brief description of the strategies 
underlying their construction will be presented here.  Kaplan and Saccuzzo (2005) 
provide a useful description of the various strategies employed in constructing 
personality measures.  Deductive strategies employ both face validity (logical –content 
strategy) and theory driven views of personality.  However the assumption that an item 
followed by a “yes” response, on the basis of content alone (“I am frequently on edge”) 
taps anxiety or the broader neuroticism dimension found on scales assessing the Big Five 
(NEO-PI-R) or the three Eysenckian dimensions (EPQ-R) may or may not be accurate.  
And for instruments that employ a face-validity perspective, the rational approach to 
constructing items to measure particular characteristics may provide the client motivated 
by other alternative needs with the opportunity to provide inaccurate and biased 
responses (e.g., see Boyle et al., 1995; Boyle & Saklofske, 2004).  For example, a scale 
purportedly tapping aggression with items such as “ I often start fights” or “I have never 
backed down from a chance to fight” may be so transparent as to increase the likelihood 
that examinees will also be more able to create a “false” impression, depending on their 
motivation (e.g., early parole or lighter court sentence, malingering). 
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The foundational basis for many contemporary personality scales includes empirical 
strategies that employ the responses of various criterion groups (e.g., anxious vs. non-
anxious adolescents) to determine how they differ on particular items and scales.  For 
example, the very successful psychopathology scales, namely the MMPI (Hathaway & 
McKinley, 1940, 1943) and the revised MMPI-2 published in 1989, and the Millon 
Clinical Multiaxial Inventories I, II, and III (Millon, 1977, 1987, 2006) as well as the 
“normal” personality trait scale, the California Personality Inventory or CPI (Gough, 
1987), are examples of instruments grounded in this approach to test construction and 
clinical use.  Criterion-keyed inventories employ the approach that is less tied to what an 
item “says” or any a priori views of what it might be assessing, but rather whether the 
item discriminates or differentiates a known extreme group (e.g., clinical groups such as 
depressed, schizophrenic, etc.) from other clinical and normal respondants. 
 
In other instances, statistical techniques, particularly factor analysis, are also used to infer 
or guide psychologists in determining the meaning of items and, thus, to define the major 
personality trait dimensions. Cattell’s Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire or 16PF 
began as a large set of items based on a lengthy trait list that were then reduced to 36 
“surface traits” and then further to 16 source traits, said to describe the basic dimensions 
of personality structure (see Boyle, 2006).  In turn, structural equation modeling (see 
Cuttance & Ecob, 1987) then allows personality structure to be examined in the larger 
context of other psychological variables to portray a more comprehensive and integrated 
description of human behaviour. 
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Finally, theory driven measures draw from descriptions of “what should be” or “folk 
concepts” (e.g., CPI) and use this as the basis for constructing personality instruments, an 
example being the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule based on Murray’s description 
of human needs.  The major personality theories that have influenced the measurement of 
personality include psychoanalysis (e.g., Rorschach Inkblot Test; Vaillant’s (1977) 
Interview Schedule for  assessing defense mechanisms), Phenomenology (Rogers & 
Dymond’s Q-sort), Behavioral and Social Learning (Rotter’s I-E Scale) and trait 
conceptions (Cattell’s 16 PF; Eysenck’s EPQ-R; and Costa & McCrae’s NEO-PI-R). 
 
Certainly, the personality scales and assessment techniques most often employed today in 
both research and clinical practice include a combination of all the above approaches.  
The Eysenckian measures (e.g., MPI, EPI, EPQ-EPQ-R), the Cattellian measures (e.g., 
16PF, HSPQ, CPQ; CAQ) as well as Big Five measures such as the NEO-PI-R have 
relied not only on theory, but also on empirical and factor analytic input into scale 
construction.  Thus, the argument may be made that the NEO-PI-R, in spite of varying 
criticisms (see Boyle, Vol. 1), is a popular instrument for assessing putative trait 
dimensions labeled: Extraversion, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and 
Openness to Experience. However, as Boyle et al. (1995, p. 432) reported, the NEO-PI-R 
accounts for less than 2/3 of the known trait variance within the normal personality 
sphere alone.  Indeed, the proponents of any one of the major personality measures we 
have listed would claim that the measure concerned is based on theory, supported by 
research findings and of practical value in clinical psychology and other applied fields. 
 
 12 
Types of personality assessment 
When one thinks of personality assessment, what usually comes to mind is the self-report 
questionnaire.  This almost exclusive reliance on questionnaires asking the respondent to 
answer a series of questions is showing signs of change and will continue to do so as 
genetic, biological, and neurological markers for particular personality traits come to the 
fore over time.  At this time, the emphasis is on multimethod assessment approaches to 
ensure a convergence of results related to personality (and other) assessment as well as 
diagnosis of cognitive and affective disorders, includes case history and other extant data, 
interview, observation, behavioural and a pot pourri of informal assessment strategies, in 
combination with standardized tests and questionnaires.  However, it would appear from 
the Meyer et al. (2001) review, that standardized, norm referenced measures (standard set 
of questions, method of administration, scoring) are the most valid and reliable of the 
currently available methods for assessing personality constructs. 
 
The use of questionnaires and self-report inventories has dominated the field of 
personality measurement.  In contrast to performance measures used in the assessment of 
cognitive ability (intelligence tests) and the assessment of skills through the use of, for 
example, driving tests, musical competitions, and electrical apprenticeship practica, 
personality assessment has largely employed somewhat subjective self-report techniques 
or reports of others using questionnaires, checklists and rating scales.  While 
questionnaire methods predated projective scales, their development was spurred by the 
need for standardized scales that would minimize human error in administration, scoring 
and interpretation.  Use of such measures also allowed quantification of the personality 
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dimensions being examined.  Accordingly, psychologists could not only determine the 
direction (e.g., introversion vs. extraversion) but also the magnitude (e.g., very high score 
on extraversion at say, the 98th percentile) of a particular trait.   This, in turn allowed for 
further refinements in assessment as well as replicability and cross-validation of the 
instruments themselves.  Standardized personality instruments are most often associated 
with the assessment of personality traits (see Matthews et al., 2003) including those 
described by H.J. Eysenck, R.B. Cattell, P.T. Costa and R.R. McCrae, D.N. Jackson, and 
others. 
 
Projective measures are grounded in the tenets of dynamic psychology, beginning with 
the early psychoanalytic work of Freud.  These measures were developed as a way of 
probing into unconscious content and motivations and to give a “window” into the basic 
personality of the client.  Here it is the subjectivity that is celebrated both in terms of the 
structure-free format that clients are given to respond, often to ambiguous  stimuli, that 
will presumably allow for the expression of personality but also the openness of 
interpretation afforded the clinician who is well grounded in the views and “clinical 
experiences” of dynamic psychology.  While there are a number of projective measures 
ranging from the Szondi and Blacky Pictures to the Rosenzweig Picture Frustration Test, 
sentence completion techniques, and House-Tree-Person Test that were created during 
the early and middle part of the last century, the Thematic Apperception Test (Morgan & 
Murray, 1935) and Rorschach Inkblot test (Rorschach, 1921) remain the most often used 
projective measures today.  Even with some waning in the interest of 
subjective/projective measures, in recent years, the well known Draw-A-Person and 
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Bender Gestalt Tests, among others, have been further extended to include the assessment 
of psychopathology and affective indicators (e.g., Draw A Person: Screening Procedure 
for Emotional Disturbance; Naglieri et al., 1991). Langens and Schmalt (Vol. 1) discuss 
more recent work that builds on the TAT. 
 
As a reaction to the psychodynamic influence in psychology and further drawing from 
the earlier success of Pavlov and Watson’s work in describing and changing behaviour, 
Skinner’s model of operant conditioning was extensively embraced following WWII and 
for the following 30 years.  Here there is no interest in inferring latent traits underlying 
the expressions of human behaviour, or searching for unconscious mechanisms (the so-
called “Black Box”) that might help explain individual differences.  Rather personality is 
viewed or operationalized as observable behaviour reflecting the interaction between the 
person and his/her environment.  Thus a behaviour that has been identified as potentially 
relevant for intervention (e.g., hitting others; talking out of turn) is observed in terms of 
frequency, duration, etc. in the context of its antecedent and consequent conditions.  Thus 
it can be determined if the behaviour requires change and if so, the prescriptive approach 
for doing so is to change those antecedent (environmental factors such as a noisy and 
distracting classroom) and/or consequent (e.g., reinforcement) conditions that would 
maintain the behaviour in question.  Furthermore, this method has considerable predictive 
utility regarding the likelihood of the occurrence of particular behaviours.  Based on 
systematic behavioural observation, there is no need to infer personality factors or an 
underlying personality structure.  However, it is the use of observational data, most 
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salient in the behavioural approaches, that is also central to the clinical and research study 
of personality. 
 
Interviews have been a mainstay of psychological information and continue to form the 
cornerstone of such specialized areas as counseling psychology.  Clinical psychology, 
industrial/organization and many other branches of applied psychology employed both 
structured and more open-ended interviews to gather critical information about a client’s 
personal history, worries and concerns, career aspirations, mental health problems, etc.  
While personality tests are essentially a form of structured interview, the use of interview 
techniques in general are considered to be less reliable and valid in diagnosis and 
treament planning.  However, in the service of a multimethod approach to personality 
assessment, interview data can have both exploratory and confirmatory usefulness.  To 
paraphrase Gordon Allport, if you want to know what people think or feel, ask them! 
 
In more recent years, explorations of the biological and neurological bases of human 
behaviour, from fields such as behaviour genetics and neuropsychology have contributed 
significantly to the study of personality.  These contributions are extensively described in 
Volume 1 in chapters by Stelmack and Rammsayer (psychophysiology) and also by 
Johnson et al. (behaviour genetics).  While many personality theories are firmly grounded 
in brain-behaviour and genetic explanations (e.g., Eysenck’s E and N factors), tests of 
these hypothetical links are now much more possible with the use of MRI and fMRI, as 
well as metabolic, neurotransmitter, and genetic measures. 
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In line with the dominant tradition of the field, many of the contributions to this volume 
are concerned with questionnaire assessments.  The various uni- and multidimensional 
personality questionnaires may be evaluated against agreed standards for determining the 
efficacy of a given psychological measure (AERA/APA/NCME Test Standards, 1999).  
These standards lay out a framework for interpreting reliability and validity, so that the 
questionnaire developer has the following obligations: 
(1) To provide evidence for the reliability of the measure in question and 
information on the standard error of measurement. 
(2) To demonstrate that a meaningful relationship exists between the test’s 
content and the construct that it is intended to measure (similar to ‘content validity’). 
(3) To provide theoretical and empirical analyses supporting (or disconfirming) 
relationships between the construct and the responses provided by the test-taker (e.g., 
checking that responses are not driven by social desirability or other biasing factors). 
(4) To demonstrate that the internal structure of the construct is as suggested by 
the underlying theoretical framework (e.g., whether it is uni – or multidimensional; 
whether it is hierachical in structure, etc). 
(5) To localize the construct within a nomological net; i.e., other individual 
differences variables to which the assessment relates, as specified by theory.  This 
criterion relates to ‘construct validity’, including establishing both convergent and 
discriminant evidence, test-criterion relationships, and investigating how validity 
generalizes across samples, situations and cultures. 
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Readers may determine for themselves how well the leading questionnaires match up to 
these test standards. We have indicated previously in this introduction the need for 
alternatives to questionnaires, including objective tests.  This volume also addresses these 
alternatives, in reviewing psychophysiological techniques that may lend themselves to 
assessment, and also implicit, objective and projective tests.  Historically, it has often 
proved difficult to obtain evidence for reliability and validity that matches corresponding 
evidence for questionnaire assessments, but the chapters here provide optimism that a 
new era of computer-interactive objective assessment may be at hand. 
 
Introduction to Volume Two 
Volume 2 contains a series of in-depth and critical chapters on the broad topics of 
personality measurement and assessment written by leading experts.  The chapters are 
grouped into several themes including general methodological issues, multidimensional 
personality instruments, assessing biologically-base and self-regulative traits, followed 
then by projective and objective personality measures, and lastly by measures assessing 
abnormal personality. 
 
Genereral Methodological Issues 
It is often said in relation to psychological assessment that the key to moving forward 
with psychometrically sound measurement rests with the definitions that are determined 
to best represents a particular domain of behaviour, psychological disturbance (or well-
being), or underlying trait such as extraversion or neuroticism.  From the start, we realize 
that this is a daunting task for psychologists that will invariably require an 
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interdisciplinary perspective and effort.  John et al. (1988) quite rightly asserted that 
“personality psychology has not yet established a generally accepted taxonomy of its 
subject matter which includes all variation in the overt social behaviour and the internal 
experiences of individuals” (p. 171).  This is based on the view that personality attributes, 
like so many other psychological constructs, including intelligence, are abstract concepts 
that are not directly observable, but rather are inferred.  The search for a generally 
supported taxonomy would provide the needed basis for personality research, in spite of 
differences in theoretical orientation by bringing “an order” to the huge collection of 
personality variables that have been created and studied over the years.  In turn, this has 
direct relevance to what we measure in our personality instruments and how we can use 
this information in understanding individual differences. 
 
Saucier contends that how we define, organize and measure personality can be guided 
from lexical studies of natural language.  In turn, these studies have formed the basis for a 
personality structure that runs the gamut from a single factor solution somewhat akin to 
‘g’ in intelligence theory and measurement, to seven lexical factors. While language may 
partly determine the number of factors that emerge in an examination of personality 
structure based on human lexicons, the issue becomes even more apparent when we 
attempt to develop measures to assess personality.  The question can be asked: are 
personality characteristics universal?  If so, then other than their expression or the actual 
behaviours observed to infer a personality characteristic, the universality of personality 
traits for example should allow for the translation and adaptation of an instrument from 
one language and culture to another.  But as we search further into the cultural and 
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linguistic fabric of differing societies, we find unique examples of personality factors that 
do not seem to have an equivalent elsewhere.  Comparing and contrasting cultures that 
are defined by an independent vs. interdependent view of the self, the Japanese concept 
of ”Omoiyari” would seem to exhibit some relationship with prosocial behaviour and 
empathy as defined in Western psychology.  However it is also unique because of the 
intuitive aspect (”sasshi”) that is valued so highly in societies that are grounded in an 
interdependent view of the person.  The chapter by van de Vijver and van Hemert 
describes the critical aspects of the methodology required in cross-cultural research and 
instrument construction and then follow this with some of the advances in the cross-
cultural measurement of personality.  It readily becomes apparent that the search for both 
universal personality factors and potentially unique clusters of personality variables will 
not be uncovered by simply comparing the responses to scales administered in two 
different countries or cultures, even if the measures are translated. 
 
In response to the diversity of views on personality that have resulted from various 
theoretical, research and measurement perspectives in psychology and allied disciplines, 
Jackson proposes a “hybrid mode”’ that should serve both heuristic and practical 
functions.  Integrating biological, experiential and social-cognitive theories, Jackson 
describes how this model departs from earlier views that appear to have fragmented 
rather than unified the study of personality (e.g., viewing approach-avoidance as 
orthogonal constructs; separating temperament and character).  Of particular interest to 
practitioners is Jackson’s contention that the proposed hybrid model will guide the 
implementation of various psychological treatment interventions.  This has been a major 
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concern of clinical, school/educational, counseling and I/O psychologists as well as those 
who practice psychology in health, military, sport, forensic and other venues.  As one 
psychologist known to the authors quipped recently, “what good does it do for the 
psychologist and client to know the client’s scores on the BIG 5 or to tell the client that 
they are a stable introvert”!  Predicting successful and unsuccessful outcomes with and 
without interventions will provide personality psychology with the status accorded to 
intelligence and intelligence tests. 
 
 
Multidimensional Personality Instruments 
The second group of chapters is focused on an examination of some of best known and 
most often used measures of personality.  In contrast to scales that are intended to assess 
psychopathology such as the MMPI-2, these measures reflect an eclectic underpinning of 
theory, trait descriptions, and factor analysis that rather describe the structure of 
personality.  As the late Professor Hans Eysenck so often reminded us, the Psychoticism 
or the P factor in his theory of personality, and also assessed on the EPQ and EPQ-R, is 
not a measure of psychotic behaviour or psychopathology.  Rather it reflects a tough 
minded-tenderminded dimension that may predispose a person to psychopathy or 
schizophrenia. 
 
The well known California Psychological Inventory is now over 50 years old and is 
considered to be very much akin to a “folk description” of personality in contrast to 
instruments either driven by theory or derived empirically from factor analysis.  There is 
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some disagreement about the actual factor structure and whether this measure is best 
described within the currently popular Five Factor Model (FFM). As well, some of the 
scales on the CPI 260 and 434 are less reliable than is minimally ideal.  However 
exploration of the current 20 CPI scales has resulted in some new scales summarized by 
Boer et al. (Vol. 2).  The CPI is one of the more often used measures in the business 
sector by I/O psychologists for personnel selection but has also been used extensively in 
counseling and forensic settings. 
 
Factor analysis has been a driving influence on the development of both intelligence and 
personality instruments.  For example, the widely recognized three strata structure of 
intelligence described by Carroll was based on an analysis of 456 factor-analytic studies 
of intelligence.  On the other hand, models of intelligence proposed, for example by 
Spearman and Thurstone many years earlier, have been tested with factor analysis (both 
exploratory and confirmatory) to determine if the proposed structure can be replicated 
with large data sets.  Certainly, many of the trait descriptions of personality are in part 
derived from factor analysis (e.g., Cattell’s 16 PF, or the theoretical structure is supported 
with the aid of factor analysis (e.g., Eysenck’s PEN model reflected in the EPQ/EPQ-R) 
 
The Comrey Personality Scales (CPS) are a very good example of how factor analysis 
has been employed over time to create the eight factors found in this measure.  As is now 
expected with all scales that employ a questionnaire format and self ratings, a validity 
and response bias scale are included to assist in determining various biases that would 
then challenge the accuracy of the report and its clinical usefulness.  Comrey has 
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provided solid empirical evidence in support of the factor structure as well as the validity 
and clinical use of these scales.  A question sometimes asked about personality scales is 
“what does it mean to be extraverted… what does this tell the psychologist or even the 
client?”  Comrey has provided clear clinical descriptions of what it means to score high 
or low on measures such as Orderliness vs. Lack of Compulsion, or Trust vs. 
Defensiveness. 
 
Probably one of the very best examples of the early use of factor analysis to define and 
measure personality characteristics as well as to expand and refine the scale is found in 
the 16PF developed by R.B. Cattell that was first published in 1949 and subsequently the 
5th revision being published in 1993.  Cattell (1973) described personality as comprised 
of three levels.  Starting with the 16 primary personality traits, factor analysis produced 
the second-order global factors that very much interface with the current Big Five 
personality factors (Krug & Johns, 1986).  In turn, two broad factors, akin to Active 
Outward Engagement and Self-Disciplined Practicality vs. Unrestrained Creativity, 
emerge from the five second order factors.  Such a model does allow for a personality 
description at several levels but also contributes to an understanding of individual 
differences (described on p.XX), as can be seen, for example, with Global Extraversion.  
Such a scale permits both research on large scale population comparisons (e.g., cross-
cultural comparisons) but also at the level of the individual who has requested counseling 
for interpersonal problems or work-related stress.  Heather Cattell also portrays the 
significant part played by the 16PF in defining the Big Five but further delves into the 
debate surrounding the correlated vs. orthogonal relationship of these factors, drawing 
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our attention to the “power” of factor analysis (varimax vs. oblique solutions) in defining 
the relational structure of personality. Another interesting issue is the relationship 
between the psychometric cornerstones of reliability and validity and how they interact to 
an optimal level on measures such as the 16PF.  Of particular interest to the readers of 
this chapter are the comprehensive references to the clinical use and applications of the 
past and current versions of the 16PF. 
 
Boyle and Barton have extended the chapter by Heather Cattell to first remind us that 
Raymond B. Cattell (as indexed by journal citations) is one of the most influential 
psychologists of the 20th century (Haggbloom et al., 2002, p. 142).  We are also reminded 
of the huge compendium of research and measurement instruments in the personality 
field alone that Cattell gave us including the Sixteen Personality Questionnaire, High 
School Personality Questionnaire, Adolescent Personality Questionnaire, Children’s 
Personality Questionnaire, Early School Personality Questionnaire, Preschool 
Personality Questionnaire, Central Trait-State Kit, Objective-Analytic Battery and the 
Clinical Analysis Questionnaire along with its more recent version, the PsychEval 
Personality Questionnaire.  This chapter then turns to an analysis of personality measures 
using Barton’s nine parameter model that targets key “Who, What, How” questions and 
echos Cattell’s call for the development of personality measures that go beyond the use of 
only L and Q- measurement but also draw from the observation of behaviour (T- data).  
Such an approach will provide psychologists with the multimethod assessment 
framework needed to converge on the most accurate and meaningful description of an 
individual’s personality.  On another note, as one reads through these two volumes and 
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possibly becomes concerned about the diversity of personality models and measurement 
approaches, we are reminded of a statement by Eysenck (1984), also named as one of the 
most influential contributors to 20th century psychology (see Haggbloom).  In an analysis 
of Cattell’s personality theory, Eysenck stated that, “the Cattell and Eysenck constructs 
and theories should be seen not as mutually contradictory, but as complementary and 
mutually supportive” (p. 336). 
 
The Big Five personality factors have dominated the personality trait literature over 
recent years.  More references are seen to Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to 
Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness as measured by the NEO-PI-R. than to 
any other set of personality traits, in spite of the lack of agreement among psychologists 
(e.g., Cattell, 1995; Eysenck, 1992; McAdams, 1992; Schneider et al., 1995).  However 
Costa and McCrae have provided a very detailed “inside” look at the construction of the 
NEO-PI-R in relation to the position of trait psychology, and criticisms of earlier 
personality measurement including other trait measures based on Eysenck’s P, E, N 
model and Cattell’s 16PF.  Moving beyond N, E and O, and influenced by Norman and 
Goldberg’s factors defining the structure of personality, Costa and McCrae engaged in an 
extensive research program that resulted in the NEO-FFI, NEO-PI and the more recent 
NEO-PI-R and NEO-PI 3 (see Boyle et al., 1995, pp. 431-433, for a critique of the factor 
analytic methodology employed in construction of the NEO-PI-R). 
 
While considerable research pertaining to scale reliability and validity has been 
undertaken and some of the key findings are included in this chapter, the question of 
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accuracy in self-report measures has been addressed quite simply in the NEO-PI and 
NEO-PI-R questionnaires.  A last item asks respondents to say if they have answered 
items honestly and accurately and if all items have been responded to and the answer 
sheet completed correctly.  However, this response can easily be manipulated.  Even if a 
person thinks at a conscious level that he/she has answered “honestly”, it does not follow 
necessarily that the responses are accurate, particularly if the individual has poor self-
insight.  This simple approach is quite in contrast to many other scales such as the 16PF, 
MMPI, PAI and BASC that have included a number of “validity” checks; however the 
computer scored version of the NEO-PI-R does give further indications of such 
potentially relevant indicators of response accuracy and bias in reporing such as the 
number of missing items.  Although in recent times the Big Five personality factors have 
tended to take “centre stage” in personality research, the use of the NEO-PI-R in applied 
settings is tempered by Costa and McCrae’s view that “more research is still needed to 
optimize its application.” 
 
As stated above, the debate over the number of traits that would “best” define personality, 
and in turn, that will have the greatest application to ”real world” settings, ranging from 
personnel selection to therapeutic intervention prescriptions, has been heard for many 
years.  Based on both taxanomic descriptions and factor-analytic investigations, it would 
appear that the three most often cited positions are those reflected in Professor Hans 
Eysenck’s (1991) paper “Dimensions of Personality: 16, 5 or 3?  Criteria for a taxonomic 
paradigm.”  Eysenck’s personality theory, while having undergone various revisions as 
outlined by O’Connor, has stayed true to the position that the three major personality 
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dimensions of Extraversion, Neuroticism and Psychoticism are sufficient to account for 
individual differences across a wide spectrum of human behaviours.  Eysenck’s model 
has resulted in the publication of a number of scales beginning with the MPI tapping 
Extraversion and Neuroticism followed by the EPI and eventually the EPQ and EPQ-R 
that included the P scale.  Children’s versions of the EPI and EPQ scales have been 
concurrently constructed by Sybil Eysenck and are referred to as the Junior versions (e.g., 
Jr. EPQ).  While Eysenck’s model clearly described a number of primary traits from 
which the second order factors of E, N, and P emerged, there was less effort invested in 
developing scales to measure each of these.  However, over time the components of 
extraversion, initially focusing on impulsivity and sociability were split off with 
sociability remaining as part of E along with such other primary traits as sensation 
seeking and venturesomeness.  While the Eysencks developed several scales to assess 
impulsivity, venturesomeness and empathy, there was also some effort to select those 
items from the EPQ defining the three-factor space to predict criminal propensity and 
antisocial behaviour.  The EPI and EPQ are still used extensively in research studies and 
have been translated and adapted for use in many different countries. 
 
Entering the taxonomic debate regarding the number of personality factors that are 
needed to account for individual differences in behaviour, the Zuckerman-Kuhlman 
Personality Questionnaire (ZKPQ) has redefined the factor space described by the Big 
Five.  As Zuckerman explains in his chapter, the ZKPQ was developed to derive a 
personality structure appropriate for measuring basic personality traits with their roots in 
biological traits.  Zuckerman provides a detailed discussion of the evolution of the ZKPQ 
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into its current five-factor structure and the labeling of the factors as ImpSS (Impulsive 
Sensation Seeking), N-Anx (Neuroticism-Anxiety), Agg-Hos (Aggression-Hostility) and 
Sy (Sociability).  While the factor structure and psychometric integrity of the ZKPQ and 
also the short-form (Zuckerman, 2002) has been replicated in cross-cultural studies, some 
studies have also attested to the potential for use in a variety of settings ranging from risk 
taking in college students (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) to the reactions of migrant 
groups to moving into a new and different culture (Schmitz, 2004).  However, because of 
its underpinnings in the psychobiology of personality, Zuckerman contends that possibly 
one of the greatest uses of the ZKPQ should be to explore the underlying basis of 
personality in the brain. 
 
Ashton and Lee have offered yet another model comprised of six factors, assessed using 
the HEXACO-PI (Ashton et al., 2006).  They have argued that studies of more than a 
dozen languages show that six personality factors appear common to all. The name of 
this model (HEXACO) serves as an acronym for the names of the factors including: 
Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality (E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), 
Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to Experience (O).  In their chapter, Ashton and 
Lee write that, “despite its lexical origins, the HEXACO model uses the name Openness 
to Experience rather than Intellect/Imagination/Unconventionality” (p.XXX).  The major 
addition to this model, in comparison with the Big Five factors, and resulting scale, again 
in comparison with the NEO-PI, is the H factor.  However, Ashton and Lee further 
suggest that the six personality factors described in their model reflect two dimensions 
representing altruistic in contrast to antagonistic tendencies, and engagement within 
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different areas of endeavour.  It is the contention of the authors that the Honesty-Humility 
and Emotionality factors are what give the HEXACO model an advantage over the 
currently popular Big Five.  This chapter provides Croatian, Greek, and Filipino data 
supporting the cross-cultural factor structure. 
 
Tellegen and Waller describe the process of constructing a measure of personality from 
both deductive and external approaches to scale construction.  However they argue that 
an “exploratory” approach used during the 10 year construction period of the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen, 1982, 1995) has the 
advantage of permitting changes during the research and development phases of test 
construction.  The authors state that, “the intent in constructing the MPQ was to clarify 
and demarcate major dimensions in the self-descriptive personality trait domain”(p.XXX) 
and offer strong support for their scale (e.g., heuristic virtues, substantial heritabilities, 
links with neurobehavioral personality models, shared factor loadings with other major 
personality scales such as the Big Five and Cattell’s 16 PF, as well as respectable scale 
reliabilities.  An interesting and controversial issue is raised in this chapter regarding the 
congruence between self and other ratings, as well as with external criteria. When 
comparing self-report personality ratings with ratings by knowledgeable others (e.g., 
spouse, friends/peers, employer/employees), it is not uncommon to see some and possibly 
considerable divergence.  This could be construed as measurement error related to the 
varying reliabilities of the scales or that the descriptors (e.g., items and scales) are aimed 
more at assessing latent traits vs. overt behavioural manifestations that are less readily 
observed by significant others.  Score discrepancies might also reflect biases in 
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responding (social desirability, malingering) by the “client” leading to a difference in self 
vs. other ratings.  Tellegen and Waller in fact argue that the very nature of the MPQ will 
possibly result in “reliable discrepancies which are potentially informative and should not 
be dismissed as simply demonstrating the fallibility of self-report” (p.XXX).  One has to 
appreciate the view taken in this chapter about the use of and feedback from personality 
measures such as the MPQ in everyday applied settings: “With use of appropriate norms, 
feedback contributes to self-clarification by translating discrete self-statements into 
coherent and telling characterizations” (p.xxx), 
 
Assessment of Biologically-based Traits 
The third section of this volume is titled “Assessment of biologically-based traits” and 
includes five chapters focusing on the biological underpinnings of personality structure 
and measurement.  A major criticism of many personality measures is that they are often 
so phenotypical in content and purpose that they miss describing the causal and 
underlying correlates of key personality traits and factors.  Saklofske and Eysenck (1994) 
stated that “trait models of personality are sometimes ciriticized for apparently pretending 
to explain differences in behaviour by simply postulating the existence of traits based on 
that behaviour….Factor analysis and other correlational methods are not meant to tell us 
anything about causality but to act as tools for the discovery of a proper personality 
taxonomy.  Having solved the problem, we may then go on to carry out the more difficult 
task of finding out why some people are more sociable, others shy, why some people are 
extraverted, others introverted” (p.XXX). 
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Brain-behaviour studies began with the earlier EEG studies and are now driven by 
technologically sophisticated techniques such as fMRI used in neuropsychological 
research.  The fields of psychobiology and psychophysiology using early measures such 
as EMG, GSR and HR, have more recently engaged in direct studies of neurotransmitters 
such as dopamine and serotonin.  The specialty areas such as behaviour genetics, initially 
studying human behaviour between individuals of varying degrees of genetic relatedness 
(e.g., kinship studies) now have access to DNA data.  All are essential for a full 
understanding of human personality that links the phenotypic expression of personality 
with the genotypic foundations. 
 
Furedy’s chapter provides an historical backdrop for the relevance of 
psychophysiological measurement in the study of personality.  He then describes how the 
following psychophysiological measures may be considered by personality researchers: 
“peripheral vs. central measures, baseline vs. response-to-challenge measures, tonic vs. 
phasic measures; uniphasic vs. multiphasic measures; lo-tech vs. hi-tech measures; 
physiological ‘respectability’ vs. psychological validity; temporal vs. localization 
measures; specific vs. reactive sensitivity; psychophysiological vs. behavioural measures; 
reliability vs. validity” (p.XXX).  But before psychologists who rely on self-report 
questionnaires, and observation and interview data begin to feel that their measures are 
less adequate and not a “direct” measure of personality, Furedy provides a very good 
example of the high reliability but low validity of the polygraph for classification 
purposes (e.g., truthful vs. deceptive individuals). 
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De Geus and Neumann provide two very good reasons for the significance of 
psychophysiological measurement in furthering our understanding of personality.  They 
point to the limitations of an over-reliance on self- and other-report “paper and pencil” 
measures that may be prone to various biases, distortions and psychometric 
shortcomings.  In contrast, psychophysiological indices have the advantage that 
“voluntary control over the recorded biological signals is limited if not absent” (p.XXX).  
At more of a construct validity level, these authors argue that personality may only be 
completely understood by also describing the biological processes underlying the major 
dimensions of personality such as the Eysenck’s Three or the Big Five.  Focusing on the 
two most agreed upon personality traits, Extraversion and Neuroticism, compelling 
evidence is provided to show their psychophsiological underpinnings, ranging from ERP 
to fMRI data.  In a similar tone to Furedy however, De Geus and Neumann also agree 
that the “reliability of psychophysiological measures is currently less convincing than 
those for paper-and-pencil measures and validity has been far more rigorously tested for 
the latter.  They suggest two reasons for the “shortfall” of psychophysiological data to 
provide a solid foundation on which to build comprehensive understandings of 
personality.  First, many studies rely only on a single measure (e.g., cerebral blood flow, 
EEG asymmetry) rather than examining the complex and often interactive nature of 
multiple causal pathways.  Second, “mainstream neuroscience is still very much focused 
on universal affective and cognitive brain processes at the expense of individual 
differences…by not taking individual differences into account, or considering them a 
mere nuisance variable, many neuroscience studies may have failed to detect a link 
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between a brain structure and the putative affective and cognitive processes in which it is 
involved” (p.XXX). 
 
Congdon and Canli focus their analysis of the biological basis of personality on the 
“primary” personality factor of impulsivity.  While impulsivity is considered a 
multidimensional construct found in many personality descriptions, included in many 
personality scales, and identified in various psychopathological (e.g., Bipolar Disorder, 
DSM-IV-TR Axis 11 disorders) and neurobehavioural (e.g., AD/HD) conditions, “the 
fact that patients are classified based on a taxonomy that is not biologically based poses a 
serious challenge to efforts to investigate the biological basis of impulsivity” (p.XXX).  
Noting the shortcomings of fitting impulsivity into the larger framework of personality, 
they describe research from noninvasive neuroimaging and molecular genetic studies that 
have separately provided support for a biological foundation.  However, their reliance of 
these studies on heterogeneous diagnostic categories and self-report measures, 
“…obscure any effect that a genotype may have on the phenotype of interest, especially 
when the size of the effect is small”. (p. XXX).  Thus the authors argue for an 
“endophenotype” approach that would combine neuroimaging and molecular genetic 
approaches and the show its efficacy in an investigation of dopaminergic gene variation 
on impulsivity. 
 
Strelau follows up on a lifetime of work on temperament which he defines as a stable set 
of personality traits, essentially present from birth or early infancy, Although 
temperament has a neurobiochemical basis, changes may occur due to external 
 33 
conditions.  This chapter briefly outlines the more significant theoretical views of 
temperament and describes some of the key measures that have evolved within the 
psychometric tradition.  The very fact that there are some 30 temperament instruments 
and more than 80 temperament scales reported in the literature, suggests that either the 
construct is so broad as to not be particularly useful in theory, research and practice, or 
that there is considerable overlap. Strelau states that “the results of factor analysis 
confirm the expectation of a broad five-factor domain of personality with temperamental 
scales located mainly in two ‘arousability’ factors: ‘emotionality/neuroticism’ and 
‘extraversion/activity’ “(p.XXX).  However, Strelau argues that much work is still 
required to add specificity to the very broad concept of temperament and to develop 
reliable and valid measures. 
 
 
Assessment of Self-Regulative Traits 
“Styles of self-regulation are integral aspects of personality” (Matthews et al., 2000, p. 
199).  They further argue that the integration of personality traits and self regulation 
requires a resolution of two divergent viewpoints; “the trait approach views personality as 
stable across time and across different situations...much of the literature on self-
regulation adopts a social-cognitive perspective that conceptualizes personality as the 
outcome of idiographic, contextually sensitive cognitive processes” (p. 171).  While most 
primary (e.g., impulsivity) and higher-order personality traits (e.g., extraversion) relate to 
styles of self-regulation, the chapters in Section 3 highlight this critical feature of human 
behaviour. 
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Shoda’s chapter complements the two chapters in Vol. 1 that examine social-cognitive 
views of personality.  Shoda further provides a detailed analysis of the social cognitive 
perspective on key questions that have confronted the study of personality. Earlier views 
of behaviour in more simple terms were described as a function of persons interacting 
with their environment (PxE).  However, the growing realization of the complexity of 
both these variables was most obvious when observing both individual and intraindivual 
differences.  While there is a predictability to human behaviours that is surely grounded 
in personality, there is also the observation that a person’s behaviours will vary across 
situations. It is not uncommon to hear expressions such as “he is a situational extravert” 
suggesting that under particular situations, and the demands arising from particular 
circumstances, a person may behave or act somewhat differently than they might under 
other conditions. Thus a purely trait perspective does not account for such variability 
across situations, but at the same time, human behaviour is not continuously random.  
Shoda argues that such variability can best be understood by knowing what features in a 
given situation are “psychologically active” for each or us. It is the psychologically 
important or “if features” of situations that activate both cognitive and affective processes 
which in turn result in thoughts, feeling and actions.  This social cognitive perspective 
outlined by Shoda suggests “that that if…then… profiles provide clues for identifying 
individuality and personality coherence within individuals’ cross-situational variability. 
This variability need not be considered a source of error to be eliminated (pXXX). 
 
As highlighted in the chapter by Fernandez, anger, hostility and aggression have been 
studied in psychology since the early formulations of Freud that elevated aggression to 
one of the major human “instincts.”  The early work of Rosenzweig using the Picture-
Frustration Test, the questionnaire analysis of aggression developed by Buss and Durkee 
(1957) , the theoretical analysis of aggression by Bandura (1983) and the more recent 
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cognitive-behavioural descriptions presented by Dodge (e.g.., Crick & Dodge, 1996) are 
but some examples of the interest in understanding and measuring aggression, anger, and 
hostility.  Fernandez distinguishes the qualitative aspects of anger from other emotions 
such as sadness and also the quantitative aspects of low (annoyance) to high levels (rage) 
but further contends that “anger can assume the form of an emotion, a mood, or a 
temperament, depending on whether it is phasic, tonic, or cyclic” (p.XXX). While 
questionnaires have served as the major methods of assessing anger and hostility, the 
major contribution of this chapter by Fernandez is the description of six core dimensions 
in the expression of anger including direction, locus, reaction, modality, impulsivity, and 
objective of anger.  Using this model, Fernandez shows how anger profiles are created 
using the anchor points of these six dimensions. 
 
In contrast to the strict trait approach for defining and measuring personality, Horowitz et 
al. have drawn from the interpersonal model of personality and have identified four 
interpersonal measures (behaviours, traits, interpersonal goals, interpersonal problems) 
that are further organized around the two interpersonal dimensions of communion and 
agency.  This allows for the creation of a profile (or “nomological net”) describing the 
individual using eight interpersonal variables.  The measures derived from this model and 
their application to personality assessment are illustrated in this chapter but more 
importantly serve to “show how the four interpersonal measures (the IMI, IAS, IIP, and 
CSIV) may be used together to clarify other concepts in clinical psychology” such as 
personality disorders. 
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Probably one of the major catalysts for stimulating an examining of the interface between 
personality and intelligence called for by Saklofske and Zeidner (1995) is the more recent 
examination of emotional intelligence (EI). The two somewhat divergent views of EI 
reflected in the trait formulation with its closer links with such personality traits as the 
Big Five and the ability model, proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997) are described in 
the chapter by Austin et al. (see. Vol. 1).  What sets the so-called ability approach apart 
from the trait EI view is the focus on the interaction between emotion and cognition. As 
Rivers et al. outline in their chapter, “Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to the capacity to 
both reason about emotion and use emotion to enhance thinking and problem solving” (p. 
XXX).  It is the skills of perceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions that 
are the foundation of EI.  Furthermore, the method of measuring EI can be contrasted. 
While trait scales (e.g., Bar-On, 1997, Schutte et al. 1998) mimic traditional self-report 
personality questionnaires where a person’s position on the scale(s) is usually determined 
using normative comparisons, the ability scales (MSCEIT and MSCEIT-YV) discussed 
in this chapter employ a problem solving approach applied to emotional situations, using 
both consensus and expert scoring (MSCEIT) and veridical scoring (MSCEIT-YV). 
 
The MSCEIT is a departure from standard personality assessment using self-report 
measures but rather, like intelligence tests, one that employs problem situations to which 
the respondent’s answers are compared to expert opinion.  Thus the low correlations 
between the two forms of EI assessment may reflect differing conceptual underpinnings 
of EI or method variance or both.  And the far from high correlations with intelligence 
tests for both trait and ability measures raises the interesting question of whether EI 
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should be considered “an intelligence” (Austin & Saklofske, 2005).  These are key issues 
raised by Roberts et al. in their paper (see Vol. 1)  which continues to look critically at EI 
models and measures following the first and more recent books by Matthews et al. (2002, 
2007).  Focusing on the “intelligence” aspect of EI, Roberts et al. argue that self report 
measures do not assess intelligence and thus should not be construed as measures of EI, 
in contrast to ability-based models that are “the only appropriate ones to delineate, and 
hence investigate, emotional intelligence” (p.XXX).  Arguing for a constrained view of 
EI, the authors then suggest that the ability (or maximum performance) model reflected in 
the MSCEIT kind of measures hold the greatest promise for assessing EI. However, they 
are currently limited by their “mono-operation and mono-method biases” and will benefit 
as well from “using new paradigms from emotions research, and new test construction 
techniques from I/O psychology” (P. XXX). 
 
Implicit, Projective and Objective Measures of Personality 
The next section of Vol. 2 turns to an examination of implicit, objective and projective 
personality measurement.  Probably no other topic in the personality assessment literature 
has generated the same level of debate as that seen between proponents of standardized 
vs. projective tests.  On another level, cross-cultural issues have also risen to the fore in 
relation to both personality as well as intelligence measures.  The “emic-etic” 
perspectives on cross-cultural comparisons have raised a number of questions about how 
well both the constructs used in one culture to operationalize and assess, say intelligence 
or personality, travel across national, cultural, and linguistic borders.  The reader may 
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also refer to Saucier’s chapter on the significance of the lexicon in determining how a 
culture describes and values various human characteristic. 
 
Paunonen and Ryan describe two “non-verbal” personality measures, the NPQ and FF-
NPQ.  In contrast to the more psychodynamic measures such as the TAT, these two 
measures focus on explicit (rather than unconscious) personality characteristics, are 
samples of behaviour reflecting personality traits rather than “signs” of some underlying 
personality disposition, and use a structured response format to ensure objective scoring 
and increase scorer reliability.  A key advantage argued for this format by Paunonen and 
Ryan is that these tests are likely more portable and flexible when assessing individuals 
from different cultural and language backgrounds because the problem of translation, but 
also reading skills level, is reduced.  In particular, the FF-NPQ should provide an 
alternative measure for determining the robustness of the Big Five across cultures. 
 
The basic difference in the assumptions posed by projective vs. standardized personality 
instruments relates to whether personality traits and factors are explicitly known to the 
person who is self-reporting or instead, that personality is more implicit and may be 
assessed with techniques referred to as Implicit Association Tests (IATs).  Schnabel et al. 
argue that IATs have a number of advantages over traditional questionnaire methods for 
assessing personality.  As described by Schnabel et al, IAT measures are designed to 
“assess automatic associations between a contrasted pair of target (such as ‘me’ versus 
‘others’) and attribute (such as ‘anxious’ versus ‘confident’) concepts through a series of 
discrimination tasks that require fast responding” (p. XXX).  A basic premise of these 
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measures is that such motivational distortion factors as faking good/bad etc. are less 
likely to confound or yield misleading results.  However, while social cognitive research 
has provided a foundation on which to build IATs, explanations for IAT effects are still 
less than fully understood, and the psychometric properties, especially reliability, of 
standard IAT measures is somewhat lower than considered desirable. At the same time, 
there is growing evidence from validity studies that IATs may provide another “method” 
for assessing personality that would allow researchers and clinicians to potentially 
address the issue of contaminating method variance that likely occurs when exclusively 
relying on self-report questionnaires.  However at this time, there is not sufficient 
evidence that IAPs should be used in clinical decision making related to diagnosis and 
treatment planning and/or selection. 
 
Schuerger provides yet a further alternative to assessing personality based on the efforts 
of Cattell and Warburton (1967) to create actual performance tests (T-data) of personality, 
a careful selection of which have been included in the Objective-Analytic Test Battery or 
OAB.  While Schuerger concedes that that original versions were very cumbersome and 
not widely adopted, the idea underlying the OAB is quite contemporary and one that 
clearly supports a multi-trait, multi-method, multi-modal approach to assessing human 
characteristics.  A consensus is lacking regarding the factor structure of the OAB with 
Schuerger stating that only six of the factors originally reported by Cattell have been 
replicated in research conducted outside Cattell’s laboratory.  However Schuerger also 
contends that the OA tests still hold remarkable promise as demonstrated in both 
educational and clinical settings, and there may be even greater untapped potential in 
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individual OA variables.  In contrast to the time when Cattell was developing the OA 
tests, the advent of modern computer technology and widespread computer use may yet 
be the format for reviving interest in such perfornce tests of personality structure.  It 
would be surprising not to find more performance measures being presented by computer 
in the very near future. Our clinical laboratories already have this capability but 
microcomputers will also make this is a reality for the “travelling clincian” such as the 
school psychologist. 
 
Standardized personality instruments such as the Eysenck and Cattell measures and 
projective techniques including the Rorschach inkblots and TAT have certainly 
dominated the field of personality assessment for much of the 20th century.  While 
personality scales are still a mainstay in contemporary psychology, including those 
described in the chapters of this volume, both research and practicing psychologists are 
also interested in assessing the manifestations and related behaviours of underlying 
personality dimensions such as and anxiety, depression, and aggression.  Thus, while the 
tendency towards aggressive behaviour can be plotted on a three-dimensional matrix 
defined by E, N, and P, of greater clinical utility to psychologists is to have more “direct” 
measures of the level and typeof aggressive behaviour.  For example, the early Buss-
Durkee scale was more focused on assessing the direct expression of aggression in its 
own right just as were the depression and anxiety scales developed by Beck.  Not all 
scales are focused on the “negative” or pathological side and in particular we now see 
scales tapping happiness, life satisfaction and subjective well-being. 
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The past several decades have witnessed the development of multiscale measures that tap 
a wide range of psychologically important behaviours.  Scales developed by Achenbach 
and Connors multidimensional measures paved the way for many of the new scales that 
tap a number of behavioural factors of relevance to clinical diagnosis and intervention 
planning.  The first and now recently revised Behavior Assessment System for Children 
developed by Reynolds and Kamphaus (1992, 2004) is not a personality measure in the 
strict sense of tapping those traits thought to underlie behaviour but rather a more direct 
assessment of behaviour itself.  The advantages they offer to the practicing psychologist 
are described by Rowe et al. who also remind us that this or any other scale should never 
“stand alone” as the sole basis for diagnosis or prescription.  The current BASC-II 
provides statements that the respondent (child, parent, teacher) answers using a 4-point 
(or True-false) Likert-type format yielding composite, primary, and content scores.  For 
example, the mixture of items on the primary self-report scales range from anxiety to 
attention problems, self-esteem to sense of inadequacy, and locus of control to sensation 
seeking, thus reflecting a very eclectic mix of scales all focusing on behaviour and the 
behaviours argued to describe, say, locus of control.  Of interest is that the BASC-II has 
become the most often used behavioural measure by school and child-adolescent clinical 
psychologists, in part because of its solid psychometric properties and time-cost benefits, 
but more so because it provides a “direct” method of assessment of both “strengths and 
problem areas.” 
 
There is clearly consensus among psychologists for a multi-method approach to 
personality assesssment based on empirically supported models and methods.  Blais and 
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Baity have critically assessed the position of the two most well known projective 
measures, the Rorshach Ink Blot Test and the TAT in the context of clinical diagnosis by 
examining the DSM-IV Axis-II personality disorders and diagnostic efficacy of current 
scoring methods for both measures.  While there is certainly controversy and 
disagreement about the use of projective instruments in assessing not just personality, but 
also psychopathology (e.g., Gacono, 2002), psychologists must remember that these are 
empirical questions that remain to be decided by the evidence.  More to the point, Blais 
and Baity also remind us that there is not a direct correspondence between the various 
Rorschach or TAT scoring systems and an acutal DSM-IV diagnosis.  Rather the 
contribution of these “performance” measures can best be realized when they are 
integrated into systems and perspectives describing personality and psychopathology.  In 
a recent paper that the reader may also wish to consult, Hughes et al. (2007) focused 
attention on the use of the Rorschach by school psyhologists and after an extensive 
review of the Rorschach and Exner’s Comprehensive System for administration and 
interpretation, concluded that they, “meet current ethical and legal starndards for tests” (p. 
288). 
 
Abnormal Personality Trait Instruments 
The last section of this volume examines several very specific measures for assessing 
abnormal personality traits either through an examation of those personality 
characteristics known or believed to underlie psychopathological behaviour, or by a more 
“behavioral” examination of particular clinical conditions and syndromes that have been 
described in DSM and ICD classifcations.  Just as the Wechsler Intelligence Scales were 
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deemed the most often used measures for assessing cognitive ability in the 20th century, 
so too, the MMPI and more recently the MMPI-2 have been among the most popular and 
often used self-report measures for assessing psychopathology.  In fact, the MMPI was so 
widely used that it found its way from primarily psychiatric and forensic settings, to 
personnel selection and university counselling settings. 
 
Again, much like intelligence tests of the earlier part of the 20th century that attempted to 
assess the full complement of cognitive abilities, the MMPI was intended as a 
comprehensive measure of the gamut of psychopathological conditions.  Thus, in some 
ways, as the chapter by Helmes points out, the MMPI does stand out as compared with 
the shorter and more specifically focused measures of abnormal personality of more 
recent years.  Both as a screening instrument and for distinguishing broad types of 
psychopathology (e.g., Depression vs. Psychopathy), both versions of the MMPI have 
served us well.  However the MMPI is more limited for differential diagnosis (e.g., 
anxiety vs. depression), but then that is an unrealistic expectation for any measure, even 
one as lengthy as the MMPI, since the diagnosis of psychological disorders requires the 
convergence of clincal data from a multimethod approach. A review of the literature 
(Helmes & Reddon, 1993) does not provide a great deal of evidence to support the use of 
the clinical scales for differential diagnosis.  With any instrument that has survived as 
long as the MMPI, there is the tendency for some myth or beliefs to “trump” what the 
evidence actually tells us about the MMPI’s clinical efficacy and empirically validated 
best practices use.  However, Helmes states that “there is promise that the new RC scales 
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will be better able to make such distinctions than the traditional Clinical scales, but the 
relevant studies have yet to appear in print” (p.XXX). 
 
The MMPI/MMPI-2 raises an interesting issue about the current role of such measures in 
clinical assessment and the issue of efficiency.  The tendency now seems to be towards 
use of shorter, more time efficient and more focused measures, although the more 
recently published BASC/BASC-II, for example, are not so brief.  The advantage of the 
MMPI/MMPI-2 is that it does serve as a broad screening measure for evaluating various 
broad types of psychopathology (or the lack thereof).  In contrast, the use of, say, a brief 
depression inventory, would only be more useful if the psychologist was either 
attempting to rule out depressive symptomatology or had formed the hypothesis of 
depression, based on other indicators (e.g., interview and presenting symptoms, family 
and previous clinical history) and was adding confirmatory evidence. 
 
What is in store for this “battleship” measure?  Helmes summarizes, “The MMPI-2 does 
not represent a highly sophisticated approach to assessment that is based upon the state-
of-the-art in diagnosis and conceptualizations of psychopathology.  Successive 
introductions of new scales have modernized aspects of the interpretation of the test, at 
the cost of providing increased opportunities for conflicting scores that need to be 
reconciled during the overly complex interpretive process.  The escalating collection of 
scales for the MMPI-2, with each successive set providing at best modest increases in 
incremental validity for some applications, simply multiply the number of potential 
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sources of interpretive conflict….the future of the MMPI/MMPI-2 thus remains difficult 
to predict” (p.XXX). 
 
While new measures, including personality, behaviour, and psychopathology measures 
continue to abound in psychology and certainly present a challenge to formerly well-
established measures, Krug reviews the Cattellian Clinical Analysis Questionnaire 
(CAQ) and its revised version, the PEPQ as measures of both normal personality and 
psychopathology.  In spite of some support for the psychometric strengths of the separate 
and composite scales, they do not appear to be often used in either research or in clinical 
settings, although in military contexts the CAQ has received considerable use (e.g., the 
Australian Army Psychology Corps has used the CAQ extensively in its psychological 
research, assessment and selection procedures—see Boyle, 1989).  This chapter raises the 
interesting issue of whether we have been too quick to abandon the theoretical, research, 
and measurement contributions of such key figures in psychology as Cattell and Eysenck.  
As noted above, Eysenck’s E and N scales as found on the EPQ and EPQ-R are 
psychometrically sound and central to a trait description of personality.  Similarly a 
thorough study of the Cattellian instruments is needed before we too quickly engage in an 
“out with the old and in with the new” attitude and later discover that we may have 
simply “reinvented the wheel” (e.g., see the number of different scales that assess risk 
taking, sensation seeking, thrill seeking, etc.) 
 
In contrast to the MMPI and MMPI-2 that are not grounded in a contemporary model of 
either personality or psychopathology, the measures described in the remaining chapters 
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provide reassuring alternatives.  The Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology 
(DAPP) measures employ a construct validation approach to arrive at a classification of 
personality disorder. Empirical evaluations leading to revisions in the initial theoretical 
description of personality disorder are supported by increases in the validity of the 
classification scheme.  The DAPP has also evolved from a somewhat different approach 
than many of the current personality and clinical scales that start with a description of the 
personality trait (e.g., extraverion) or disorder (e.g., anxiety).  Rather than beginning with 
this a priori view, Livesley and Larstone state that the DAPP, “incorporates a bottom-up 
approach in which diagnostic constructs evolve based on empirical evidence of the way 
the features of personality disorder are organized” (P. XXX).  The advantage of this 
approach is that it provides for a dynamic rather than static view of personality criteria 
and categories that is forced to modify or change with new evidence from both research 
studies and clinical use.  Even more compelling is the reconciliation between normal and 
abnormal personality that were treated quite separately even into the latter part of the 20th 
century.  This may well be why measures such as the EPQ and NEO-FFI and NEO-PI 
appeared in stark contrast to the many separate pathology scales (e.g., MMPI), with the 
latter not grounded in underlying personality factors but rather collections of psychiatric 
symptoms.  The DAPP and its counterparts have provided the foundation for the much 
needed reconciliation between basic descriptions of personality models and traits, on the 
one hand, and personality disorders and psychopathology on the other. 
 
As noted above, while there has been a tendency towards constructing more specifically 
focused and brief measures of both normal and abnormal personality traits, in contrast, 
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the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) devised by Morey (1991, 2007), has been 
constructed on the basis of contemporary diagnostic classifications, and as an attempt to 
overcome the well-documented limitations of the MMPI/MMPI-2 instruments.  The PAI 
comprises no fewer than 344 items with a mix of validity, clinical, treatment 
consideration and interpersonal scales.  Morey and Ambwani summarize findings 
showing that this multidinesional inventory has received increasing attention in both 
research and clinical practice settings.  Studies supporting the validity of the PAI 
subscales in the assessment of a wide range of psychological problem areas, ranging from 
eating disorders to emotional injury, will ensure its continued use in both applied and 
research settings. 
 
This section ends with a summary of the Millon inventories and a view of personality 
assessment.  All would agree that any single theory and measurement instrument, no 
matter how robust or narrow can ever give a complete description of an individual’s 
personality structure.  As Millon argues, our efforts to measure human personality with a 
predefinded set of traits that are reflected in our assessment tools is complicated by the 
very nature of examining a breakdown of these traits for each individual, and then 
reconstructing a description of personality;  the "loop” from idiographic individuality to 
nomothetic commonality to nomothetic individuality is brought to closure” (p.XXX).  
Millon’s chapter provides a detailed overview of the inventories that he has developed 
over the past several decades, highlighting the links with both the DSM and ICD 
taxonomies of personality disorders, as well as the theoretical basis for conceptualing 
both personality and abnormal behaviour.   The critical question that has so often been 
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posed regarding the direct association between assessment, diagnosis and treatment 
planning or therapy is addressed by Millon who argues that his inventories provide a 
necessary basis for associating polarity schemes and clinical domains with corresponding 
theapies: “Any discussion of personalized psychotherapy…must take place at a level of 
abstraction or integration commensurate with that of personality itself.  Personality 
disorders and clinical syndromes cannot be remedied if the person is thoroughly 
integrated while the therapy is not.  Therapy must be as individualized as the person” 
(p.XXX). 
 
Summary Comments 
The chapters included in this volume are testimony to the incredible progress that has 
been made in the measurement and assessment of personality, particularly in more recent 
years.  Guided by various theoretical models and research findings as well as extensive 
interdisciplinary collaboration, the sophistication of psychological measurement will 
continue to provide the necessary assessment tools to further our basic and applied 
analysis of human personality.  Each chapter in this volume is a celebration of the the 
research contributions and clinical knowledge of leading experts in personality 
measurement and assessment.  We thank all of the authors for sharing with us their 
critical analyses of the models and methods for measuring personality and especially their 
insights and creativity that will serve well the clinical assessment of personality. 
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Table 1. Objective vs. subjective assessments of personality – some key issues 
 Objective Testing Perspective Subjective Testing Perspective 
   
Meaningfulness of self-
reports 
People often lack insight into their 
true personalities. Personality may 
be shaped by unconscious forces 
(psychoanalysis) or by 
situationally-specific implicit 
learning processes. 
Self-reports are a class of 
behaviours that may usefully index 
latent personality traits. As Cattell 
(1973) pointed out, self-reports may 
be treated as behaviours whose 
meaning can be established through 
research (Q’ data) rather than as 
veridical insights (Q data). 
Role of response bias Self-reports often reflect no more 
than trivial response styles (e.g., 
acquiescence), or deliberate 
impression management (e.g., 
faking). Techniques for assessment 
of response bias may themselves be 
open to manipulation. 
Response bias may be assessed 
independently from latent traits. 
Furthermore, some ‘biases’ may be 
integral to personality and worth 
investigating as substantive traits 
(Paulhus, 2002). 
Biological basis of 
personality as the basis for 
measurement 
If personality is biologically based, 
it is unlikely that self-reports map 
directly onto the brain systems 
controlling traits. Research should 
work towards direct assessment of 
Traits may be higher-level 
emergent personal qualities that are 
not isomorphic with any single 
brain system (Zuckerman, 1991). 
Thus, it is difficult to capture traits 
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individual differences in neural 
functioning and their molecular-
genetic sources. 
in their entirety using biological 
indices. Specific biological theories 
also have only mixed support from 
empirical tests (Matthews & 
Gilliland, 2005). 
Status of objective, implicit 
and projective tests 
It is questionable whether 
subjective experience possesses the 
scaling properties necessary for 
quantitative measurement models 
(cf., Barrett, 2005). Tests based on 
objective behaviours may be 
intrinsically superior to subjective 
reports in supporting adequate 
measurement. 
Historically, the reliability and 
validity of leading projective tests 
has been controversial. The new 
generation of implicit measures do 
not yet have the extensive 
nomological net of traits assessed 
by questionnaire. Such traits 
currently possess superior criterion, 
construct and consequential 
validity. 
